Drawing on examples of recently published and widely-cited studies in experimental economics, we show that behavioral games are frequently analyzed in a manner that is prone to biased causal inference. First, deficiencies in design and implementation jeopardize the crucial assumption that treatments are statistically independent of potential outcomes. Researchers frequently do not randomly assign treatments or do not focus on randomly assigned factors when interpreting results. Second, many analyses of second mover behaviors in two-stage games, such as the ultimatum game and the trust game, are susceptible to bias. Third, uncontrolled stimuli, such as face-to-face interaction among subjects or the presentation of subjects' photos, may also cause bias. Fourth, we discuss the limits of causal inference in repeated games, such as the public goods game. We recommend adjusting laboratory procedures and estimation methods in order to lessen reliance on substantive assumptions not grounded in experimental design.
Introduction
Recent years have seen rapid growth in the scale and prominence of laboratory research in experimental economics. By almost any metric -the number of articles in leading journals, major laboratories, or courses offered in graduate programs -experimental economics is thriving. The mounting influence of laboratory work is also apparent outside economics, especially in political science (Morton and Williams 2010) , and researchers in all fields are now applying behavioral games in non-laboratory environments and in non-Western settings (Henrich et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2010; Habyarimana et al. 2009 ).
Without disputing the many accomplishments of laboratory experiments in general (Falk and Heckman 2009) or behavioral games in particular (Camerer 2003) , this paper points out several recurrent but largely unnoticed problems with the way in which laboratory games are analyzed statistically. Most of these problems are traceable to lab procedures that do not eliminate systematic, unmeasured heterogeneity among subjects or among the stimuli to which subjects are exposed. As we stress below, these problems are fixable. Sometimes the solution is to analyze existing data with closer attention to issues of identification; in other cases, the solution is to modify an experimental design in order to more convincingly satisfy core statistical assumptions. This paper is organized as follows. We begin by characterizing the statistical objectives and underpinnings of laboratory research using a potential outcomes framework (Neyman 1923 (Neyman [1990 ; Rubin 1974 Rubin , 1990 . Doing so serves two purposes. First, it helps distinguish between two experimental objectives: measurement and causal inference. Second, it reveals the central role of three core assumptions necessary for unbiased causal inference: the independence of experimental treatments and subjects' potential outcomes, the irrelevance of treatments administered to other subjects, and irrelevance of treatments other than the ones assumed by the experimenter. The remainder of the paper discusses ways in which laboratory procedures and statistical analyses that fail to eliminate systematic heterogeneity among subjects or experimental treatments may jeopardize one or more of these core assumptions. Illustrations are drawn from two classes of journal articles, the "widely-cited" and the "recently published."
For purposes of our review, widely-cited articles comprise peer-reviewed journal articles that were published from 2000 onwards and cited at least 100 times according to Google Scholar as of September 2012. The set of recently published laboratory studies consists of articles published in the journal Experimental Economics during 2011. 1 We discuss threats to inference posed by unobserved heterogeneity due to non-random assignment or attrition, repeated play, and uncontrolled stimuli, concluding each section with suggestions for experimental design and data analysis.
Potential Outcomes and Core Statistical Assumptions
The aims and analysis of experiments are often explicated in terms of a potential outcomes framework that has its origins in Neyman's work in the 1920s (Neyman 1923 (Neyman [1990 ) and is often termed the "Rubin Causal Model," after Rubin (1974) . Consider a set of subjects indexed by the subscript i. Each subject possesses these two potential outcomes, only one of which will be expressed empirically, depending on whether the subject is actually treated or not.
Let be the outcome expressed by subject i if subject i is not exposed to the treatment, and let be the outcome if subject i is exposed to the treatment.
For each subject, the treatment effect is defined as the difference between two potential outcomes, one in which the individual receives the treatment, and another in which the individual does not:
.
This characterization of a unit-level causal effect is agnostic about whether treatment effects vary from one subject to the next.
Moving from a single individual to a set of individuals, we define the average treatment effect (ATE) as follows:
,
where indicates an expectation over all subjects. The average treatment effect may be thought of as the average change in outcomes that would occur if all subjects went from their untreated to their treated states. 1 The list of articles meeting these criteria is presented in the Appendix.
The ATE is usually the estimand of interest in experimental research. To cite but a few examples, Burnham et al. (2000) seek to estimate the average effect of priming participants playing a trust game to think of other players as "partners"
or "opponents"; Fehr and Gächter (2000) ask whether introducing the opportunity for punishment causes an increase in cooperation in public goods games; and Kosfeld et al. (2005) study the effect of the hormone oxytocin on behavior in a trust game. These studies may be characterized as attempts to gauge the average causal effect of an intervention, be it the words used in the experimental instructions, the presence of a punishment mechanism in the behavioral game, or a dose of oxytocin.
Many laboratory studies, however, have more limited aims. Rather than assess the average effect of an intervention, measurement studies aspire to estimate only or , but not both. For example, some lab studies of the ultimatum game attempt to estimate the rate at which subjects in various cultures reject offers (Henrich et al. 2001) , while others estimate the average size of rejected offers in different countries (Oosterbeek et al. 2004) . 2 In these studies, there is no experimental treatment (or, equivalently, the experimental treatment is the same for all participants). Without disparaging this type of study, which may provide useful information about the prevalence of certain types of players in different times or places, we restrict our discussion to intervention studies, which attempt to make causal claims about the effects of an intervention and therefore fall squarely within the Rubin causal modeling framework.
3
By administering a treatment to some subjects and not others, an intervention study reveals either their treated or untreated potential outcomes. Let denote the treatment status of each subject. For example, we may define if treated and if not. (Later, we will allow to take on a range of values, for example, the number of tokens that a person receives from another player.) 2 The ultimatum game involves two players. The first mover proposes how to divide a sum of money between the two players, and the second mover can either accept or reject this proposal. If she rejects, neither player receives anything. 3 Another important strand of laboratory research outside the scope of our study seeks to assess whether a sample as a whole reaches the equilibrium predicted by a theoretical model. For example, Camerer et al. (2004) argue that cognitive hierarchy theory fits empirically observed behavior in beauty contest games better than equilibrium theory. One way to characterize this type of investigation (which often does not involve an explicit control group) is to define potential outcomes at the level of the group of participants in session and to assess whether observed group outcomes across sessions equal some posited .
We may use this system of notation to express the difference in expected outcomes among treated and untreated individuals:
where the notation means the average value of among those individuals for which the condition holds. For example, following Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) , who study the amount of money transferred in a dictator game, one could compare average outcomes among subjects who play with a person of their own ethnicity to average outcomes among subjects who play with a person of different ethnicity ). 4 Suppose our estimation strategy were to compare average outcomes among the treated to the untreated, as in equation (3). This comparison will not, in general, reveal the average causal effect of the treatment given in equation (2).
We observe average outcomes for the treated subjects in their treated state and average outcomes of the untreated subjects in their untreated state. To see how this quantity may differ in expectation from the ATE, we rewrite equation (3) as:
In other words, the expected difference in outcomes between the treated and untreated can be decomposed into the sum of two quantities: the average treatment effect for a subset of the subjects (the treated), and a selection bias term.
The selection bias term (in braces) is the difference between the expected untreated potential outcomes among those who receive the treatment and those who do not. The threat of selection bias arises whenever systematic processes determine which people receive treatment. In this example, suppose people living in segregated areas have distinctive potential outcomes and, when recruited into the experiment, are more likely to play behavioral games with others of their same ethnicity. Under this scenario, expected potential outcomes among those who play with others of their same ethnicity are likely to differ from expected potential outcomes among those who play with people of different ethnic backgrounds.
Random assignment helps to solve the selection bias problem. Suppose that of the subjects are assigned at random to the treatment group, and the remaining are assigned to the control group. When random assignment determines which treatment each subject receives, is independent of potential outcomes. The treated potential outcomes of those randomly assigned to the treatment group are therefore the same, in expectation, as the treated potential outcomes among those assigned to the control group:
. (5) By the same token, those randomly assigned to the control group have the same expected outcomes as those assigned to the treatment group:
. (6) Equations (5) and (6) reveal why, when subjects are randomly treated, the selection bias term vanishes and the difference between treatment and control group means, in expectation, recovers the ATE. This identification result can be
shown by substituting equations (5) and (6), which hold under random assignment, into equation (3):
Equation (7) demonstrates that randomized experiments are capable of generating unbiased estimates of the ATE of a single treatment. Independence between potential outcomes and treatment assignments is a core assumption that is satisfied by lab procedures that implement random assignment. The situation becomes more complicated in cases where conditional treatments are involved.
Below, we discuss the case of a two round trust game in which the causal question is the extent to which second round players are affected by the first round contributions of either males or females. In this case, when second round players are randomly paired with either male or female first round opponents, the independence assumption holds conditional on the amount given and the sex of each player. In this instance, amongst second round players of a given sex who receive a given number of tokens in the first round, the sex of the first player is independent of the second player's potential outcomes. So long as we restrict our comparison of average outcomes to those subjects with the same expected potential outcomes, this average treatment effect is identified.
In addition to independence, two further assumptions are implicit in the setup that gets us to equation (7). One is termed the stable unit treatment value assumption or SUTVA (Rubin 1990) , which implies that potential outcomes do not depend on which subjects are assigned to treatment. 5 This assumption is invoked when we stipulate that the only relevant potential outcomes are and ; rightly or wrongly, we assume that the sole input is whether the subject herself is treated. This assumption is violated when the treatment administered to one experimental subject affects the outcomes of other subjects. In that case, potential outcomes are no longer "stable" because they vary depending on which experimental subjects happen to receive treatment. In a laboratory setting, for example, SUTVA is jeopardized by spillover effects when a subject glances at her neighbor's computer screen or when a treated subject discusses the treatment with an untreated subject.
The other core assumption is excludability (Angrist et al. 1996) , which requires that outcomes respond solely to the treatment itself and not some other backdoor causal pathway that is set in motion by the assigned treatment.
Formally, if we call the assigned treatment , where indicates treatment assignment and indicates control assignment, excludability requires that for any value of the assigned treatment and any value of the actually received treatment . For example, suppose the aim of an experiment is to estimate the effect of group size on the provision of public goods in a public goods game. 6 The treatment is whether a group is large ( ) or small ( ). Suppose, however, that when subjects are assigned to a large group ( ), the lab assistant reads the instructions in a way that implies that contributing to the common pool is a foolish strategy. When subjects are assigned to the small group ( ), the lab assistant reads the instructions in a neutral fashion. Under these circumstances, the apparent effect of the treatment is confounded by the effect of the instructions; even if the group size treatment had no effect, subjects assigned to larger groups might contribute less to the common pool. In practice, violations of the excludability assumption are rarely so obvious.
Instead, as we note below, they arise in more subtle form when subjects are allocate a sum of money between herself and one or more other players ("receivers"). 5 Formally, SUTVA states that if , , where denotes the vector of treatments administered to all subjects. In other words, holding constant a given subject's treatment status, the potential outcomes for that subject are unaffected by the treatment status of other subjects. 6 In the public goods game (also known as the investment game) a subject chooses how much of her original endowment she keeps and how much she invests in a public pool. The public pool is multiplied by the experimenter and distributed equally among all subjects in the group -including those who did not invest.
presented with more than one treatment in the course of their interactions with other players or when receipt of the intended treatment is measured imperfectly.
SUTVA and excludability both refer to situations in which there is a mismatch between the potential outcomes envisioned by the researcher and the potential outcomes that are actually set in motion during the course of an experiment. The examples described in the next section can be characterized either as SUTVA violations (insofar as the treatment that subject receives affects subject 's potential outcomes) or as excludability violations (insofar as the treatment assignment of subject affects potential outcomes over and above the effect of the ostensible treatment). Either way, the upshot is that common estimation strategies, which rest on these core assumptions, are prone to bias.
Threats to Core Assumptions in Practice
Drawing examples from prominent laboratory studies, we next consider ways in which these core assumptions, independence of treatments and potential outcomes, excludability, and SUTVA, may be jeopardized in the course of experimental design and data analysis.
Independence
Because potential outcomes are only partially observed (we observe or but not both for the same individual), one cannot directly assess whether potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment.
The most convincing way to defend the independence assumption is by reference to the procedure by which subjects are assigned to treatment or control groups. As noted above, when allocation is determined by a random procedure, independence holds. Despite the importance of random assignment, its use in experimental economics is often difficult to discern from the way in which lab procedures are described in print. Of the 27 widely-cited articles that we reviewed, 20 varied the experimental treatment in some way. Of these 20 articles, only 8 stated explicitly whether experimental subjects were allocated randomly to the various treatment conditions. Even among the recently published experimental studies we reviewed, only 6 described their treatment assignment procedures explicitly as random, while 14 did not (the remaining 3 could be classified as measurement studies).
When subjects are allocated in some systematic or ad hoc fashion -for example, when subjects who show up to the morning session are assigned as a cluster to the treatment while subjects who show up to the afternoon session are assigned to the control -the independence assumption becomes a matter of conjecture. 7 In effect, the researcher must adduce substantive assumptions in order to defend the proposition that early birds and latecomers have exchangeable potential outcomes. To some extent, these substantive assumptions may be bolstered with evidence. For example, a researcher might demonstrate that subjects who showed up in the morning have similar observable attributes (e.g.
gender or age) to the subjects who showed up in the afternoon. However, uncertainty remains about whether their unobserved attributes, and hence their potential outcomes, are similar. For example, the afternoon cohort might have taken an economics class in the morning, which might reveal something distinctive about their potential outcomes.
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Even if the differences between subjects who show up in the morning or afternoon are in fact innocuous, uncertainty about selection bias means that the nominal standard errors associated with the estimated ATE understate the true standard errors (Gerber et al. 2004 ). For example, suppose subjects are allocated based on some systematic factor, such as the day in which they arrive at the lab. In order to illustrate the role of uncertainty, suppose that the researcher's prior about 7 In total, 23 out of the 50 studies reviewed for this paper used some type of the clustered design. For example, Burnham et al. (2000) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2011) assigned subjects to either treatment or control conditions according to the day that they showed up to the lab. In one extreme case, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) assigned all the subjects who signed up for the experiment in November 2007 to the first treatment group, subjects from February 2008 to the second treatment group, and subjects from April 2010 to the third treatment group. 8 Clustered assignment complicates the assessment of sampling variability (Wooldridge 2003) . Typically, failure to account for clustered assignment leads to standard errors that are too small, which therefore exaggerates significance levels. There appears to be growing awareness of the need to take clustering into account when estimating standard errors. Of the 14 articles published in 2011 that used clustered assignment, 10 clustered standard errors. A further concern arises when clusters vary in size from one random assignment to the next, in which case the usual method of comparing treatment and control group means may lead to biased estimates of the ATE (Middleton 2008) . One way to avoid this problem is to block on cluster size when assigning clusters, which keeps the bias associated with this allocation procedure is distributed . An experiment is conducted, yielding an estimate of 2 with a nominal standard error of 1. After applying Bayes' Rule to these inputs, 9 the researcher's posterior distribution is centered at the estimate of 2, but the posterior distribution has a standard deviation of 1.41. Although the nominal standard error of 1 implies a two-sided -value of 0.046, the uncertainty-adjusted standard error of 1.41
implies a more equivocal -value of 0.157. In effect, the hidden cost of failing to randomly assign is that the reported standard errors are downwardly biased.
Even when treatments are allocated randomly, the threat of selection bias may creep in due to the way in which researchers analyze their experimental data.
For example, Solnick (2001) reports the results of an experiment in which pairs of players played a one-round ultimatum game for $10 with either someone of a known gender (where gender was communicated by revealing their genderidentifying first names) or someone of an unknown gender (where players knew each other only by a numeric identifier). The author does not say explicitly that assignment to the gender or number treatments was random, but suppose it was.
The author notes that subjects lacking "gender-identifying names" were excluded from name condition; no such restriction was imposed on the condition that used numeric identifiers (Solnick 2001) . The fact that different criteria were used to retain subjects in the two conditions jeopardizes the assumption that the two groups have the same expected potential outcomes. The same concern applies to the practice of excluding from analysis subjects with a certain value of the outcome variable (Ballinger et al. 2011) . If treatments affect outcomes, but subjects with certain outcomes are excluded from analysis, estimates of the ATE may be biased (Angrist et al. 2006 ).
Concerns about the independence assumption apply as well to the causal interpretation of factors that are not subject to random assignment. Laboratory researchers frequently offer causal interpretations of the "effects" of their subjects' background attributes. For example, Glaeser et al. (2000) describe one of their main findings as follows:
the proportion of subjects in each experimental group fixed. Another solution is to restrict clusters to a predetermined size. 9 Following Theorem 1 in Gerber et al. (2004) , we assume that the experimental result is drawn from a normal sampling distribution. In this example, we also assume for simplicity that the researcher has noninformative priors concerning the true ATE.
[B]ackground characteristics capturing the level of status and organization membership-variables meant to serve as proxies for an individual's own social capital-strongly predict the amount of money that senders receive back from recipients, and strongly predict the financial returns for senders. People with better educated parents, students who work fewer hours for pay, individuals with more friends, and members of volunteer organizations all earn more money in the experiment. These results imply that in at least one stylized setting, noncognitive social skills may be important determinants of economic returns.
When describing experimental findings, it is appropriate to note which covariates predict outcomes. 10 But nothing about the experimental design justifies the inference that these background attributes are "determinants" of outcomes, which implies a causal relationship. In this application, subjects' stock of "social capital"
is not subject to random assignment and may be correlated with unobserved variables that affect outcomes.
There is a fine line between describing the behavior of subjects with different background attributes and drawing causal inferences about the effects of those background attributes. Buchan et al. (2008) conclude that men are more trusting than women and women more trustworthy than men. Eckel and Grossman (2001) infer that black subjects are more generous and equitable in an ultimatum game than other races. These studies do not randomly assign gender or race to the subjects, and there is no design-based reason to suppose that subjects of various races or genders had identical expected potential outcomes. These studies describe the behavior of different subgroups. And as descriptions go, these particular characterizations of male-female and black-white differences are limited by the fact that the subjects are not sampled at random from clearly defined populations of interest. Instances in which authors offer causal interpretations of covariates may also be found among recent studies published in
Experimental Economics Ballinger et al. 2011 ).
In sum, the independence assumption plays a crucial role in causal inference and warrants more attention in the presentation of laboratory research. If random assignment is used, researchers should describe in detail how subjects were allocated to experimental conditions (and whether they were later removed or reassigned). During the 1990s, randomized controlled trials in medicine were criticized along similar lines. Reporting practices improved markedly when medical journals required that manuscripts conform to the CONsolidated Standards Of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Statement (Moher et al. 2001 ).
Treatment Effect in Sequential Games
We next take up the problems of causal inference that arise in the context of games that involve a sequence of decisions by two or more players (for example, the trust game or the ultimatum game). Suppose that at the beginning of the sequence of moves, first movers are exposed to a randomly assigned treatment and then make a decision of some sort. For example, prior to their first move, they may be informed that they are playing a trust game with a person of the same or different gender. 11 At this point, the excludability and SUTVA assumptions are satisfied; unbiased estimates of the ATE of the second mover's gender on the first mover's trust may be obtained by comparing first movers who are paired with male opponents to first movers who are paired with female opponents. Now consider the problem of inference that arises when the second mover's behavior is analyzed in order to estimate the average effect of the first mover's gender on the second mover's trustworthiness. The second mover is in effect presented with two treatments, the gender of the first mover and the amount that the first mover gives. 12 When estimating the ATE of the first mover's gender on the second mover's behavior, it is tempting but potentially biased to just compare second movers who are paired with male first movers with second movers who are paired with female first movers.
In order to see how the possibility of bias arises, let us consider a simple illustration in which four types of players are recruited for an experiment involving a trust game. Two types are male, and two are female. Table 1 presents a schedule of potential outcomes that indicates precisely how each subject will respond to every experimental condition, whether in the role of first or second mover. Everything in this example is deterministic except the assignment of the players to partners and to their roles as first or second movers; assignment is random. In order to sidestep the complications that arise when a finite number of subjects are paired with one another, we assume that these four player types are drawn with replacement from a population of players, so that a player of a given type is equally likely to play with any other type, including her own.
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[ Table 1 about here]
Let us now examine whether a randomized experiment will on average recover the causal parameters of interest. We begin by assessing the true value of the parameter in this example. Table 1 indicates that among first movers the ATE of the second mover's gender is zero. Across all player types, the average contribution Y i is 5 when the second mover is male, and it is also 5 when the second mover is female. The schedule of potential outcomes also indicates that among second movers, the first mover's gender has no effect whatsoever. Players return nothing when the first mover gives them nothing; players return an average of 30/4=7.5 tokens when given 10 tokens by a male first mover, and they return an average of 30/4=7.5 tokens when given 10 tokens by a female first mover.
Among second movers in our contrived example, not only is the ATE zero, but the treatment effect is zero for every subject type.
In order to assess the properties of an estimation approach that compares average outcomes in the treatment and control conditions, we consider the average experimental outcome across all possible random assignments (Table 2 ). There 12 Expanding the notation used above, we may characterize each subject's potential outcomes as . 13 If the estimand is the average treatment effect among the subjects at hand, the SUTVA assumption may be jeopardized when the treatment received by one player affects the potential outcomes of other players. For example, the removal of one generous player from the treatment group may affect how others will play if assigned to the treatment are 16 possible ways in which four first mover types may be paired with four second mover types. When treated with a male as opposed to female second mover, first movers on average contribute the same amount. On average, the experiment therefore recovers the true ATE of zero. The analysis of second movers' behavior is more challenging. Although the gender of the first mover has no actual effect on the behavior of second movers, the experiment seems to suggest otherwise. On average, a second mover who is paired with a male first mover returns 5 tokens, whereas a second mover paired with a female first mover returns only 2.5 tokens. The estimated ATE of facing a male first mover is 2.5 and not 0. What went wrong?
[ Table 2 about here]
The second mover responds to a combination of treatments, only one of which is controlled by the experimenter. The gender of the first mover is randomly assigned; how much the first mover gives the second mover is an uncontrolled stimulus. Excludability is violated in this example because the amount contributed by the first player is correlated with the first mover's gender, so if the researcher compares second movers according to the gender treatment they received, the apparent effect of gender will be confounded by the amount that the first player contributed. In our example, male first players are more likely to make a positive contribution, and by merely reciprocating their generosity, second movers seem to discriminate in favor of men.
Experiments reported in several widely-cited articles are susceptible to this type of bias. For example, Burnham et al. (2000) reports that 68% of second movers primed by the word "partner" and 33% of second movers primed by the word "opponent" returned money in a single-shot trust game. Taken at face value, the experiment seems to show that the priming treatment increased by 35 percentage-points the rate at which second movers returned money. But this calculation ignores the fact that second movers were exposed to two stimuli, the partner/opponent prime and the move of the first player. The former is randomly assigned, but the latter is not under experimental control and may introduce bias.
group. Violations of SUTVA may be especially acute in experiments with small numbers of subjects.
In an effort to obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effect on the second player's behavior, some studies partition second movers according to both the treatment and the amount sent by the first mover.
14 Expressed in terms of our running example, researchers seek to recover the following estimand: Holding constant the amount contributed by the first mover, how does the first mover's gender affect the second mover's behavior? For instance, one might assess how second movers behave on average when given 10 tokens by male versus female first movers. Unfortunately, an estimation strategy that compares how second movers behave when given 10 tokens by male or female first movers is also prone to bias. The bias of this estimation approach is apparent when applied to Table 1 . Table 2 reveals that, on average, a second mover who is paired with a male first mover and given 10 tokens returns 40/6 = 6.67 tokens, while a second mover paired with a female first mover and given 10 tokens returns 20/2 = 10 tokens.
And, on average, a second mover who is paired with a male first mover and given zero tokens returns 0/2 = 0 tokens, while a second mover paired with a female first mover and given zero tokens returns 0/6 = 0 tokens. Taking a weighted average of the two differences yields an estimated ATE of -1.67, but the true ATE is in fact zero. Controlling for the amount sent is not necessarily an unbiased estimation strategy.
In order to recover the true ATE of zero, one must make an even more exacting comparison, assessing the effect of the treatment (the first mover's gender) conditional on both the amount sent by the first player and the gender of the second player. In our running example, this comparison correctly reveals no difference between how male second players respond to receiving 10 tokens from first movers, regardless of whether they are male or female. 15 In other words, if we want to isolate the average treatment effect, we must ensure that we are comparing subjects with the same expected potential outcomes, which means conditioning on all of the inputs that systematically affect potential outcomes. A 14 For example, Kosfeld et al. (2005) compares the trustee's transfer of money back to the investor separately for four different amounts originally transferred by the investor to the trustee in a trust game. Similarly, Eckel and Grossman (2001) study rejection rate in an ultimatum game across nine different offers. 15 In this example, we have identified the conditional ATE among males rather than the ATE among all subjects because our example does not have instances of female second movers who receive 10 tokens from both male and female first movers. This lack of common support for female players is a feature of our hypothetical example and seldom a concern in practice.
simple comparison of means will not do, and neither will a comparison of means controlling for the amount that the first player sends.
Notice the implications for regression, which is commonly used to analyze trust games. Regression models frequently include the amount sent by the first mover as a control variable on the grounds that "controlling for the amount sent, the amount returned is a measure of trustworthiness" (Glaeser et al. 2000) . Among the widely-cited studies, Burks et al. (2003) and Karlan (2005) The problem is that regression will not in general recover average treatment effects unless the model controls for all systematic sources of heterogeneity. In the case of our example, a fully saturated regression model would include a constant, an indicator for the treatment (first mover's gender), an indicator for the second mover's gender, a measure of the amount given by the first mover, and all possible interactions, for a total of eight parameters. 16 The parameter estimates can be used to calculate the ATE for each subgroup, which can be aggregated to form an overall ATE for the subject pool. A fully saturated regression model produces unbiased estimates even if second movers do not react to the first move. 17 This regression model is fairly easy to implement, but none of the seven articles that applied regression to the second mover's behavior in our sample of literature used this modeling approach.
As we stress below, regression will only be able to recover the parameters of interest if the systematic sources of heterogeneity are fully measured. In the preceding example, we are able to condition on observables -the first and second 16 Monte Carlo simulations based on the schedule of potential outcomes in Table 1 illustrate how regression is prone to bias when used to study the second mover's behavior. The regression approach produces the same biased apparent "gender effect" of 2.5 for second movers as the comparison of means does. If we include the amount sent by the first mover as a covariate, the estimate is biased down to -1.67. A fully saturated regression model, however, recovers correctly the null effect of the first mover's gender. Two of the parameters in that model are not estimable in this example because we never observe instances in which female second movers receive 10 tokens from female first movers. 17 It is possible to construct examples in which unbiased estimates of the ATE may be obtained without a fully saturated model, e.g., if all treatment effects on both movers are mover's gender and the behavior of the first mover -such that all remaining heterogeneity in potential outcomes is independent of the treatment of interest.
Below we consider the estimation problems that arise when potential confounders are only partially measured, such as uncontrolled attributes of subjects (section 3.3) or previous rounds of a game (3.4). For example, unmeasured session-level variables might affect both movers in a game, in which case a fully saturated regression model may still be prone to bias.
Rather than attempt to address problems of heterogeneity at the estimation stage (which presupposes proper modeling and measurement), a better approach is arguably to address estimation concerns at the design stage of the experiment.
Design-based approaches include the following:
1. Analyze only the behavior of the first mover. Researchers would still be in a position to obtain unbiased estimates of meaningful parameters -see for example Charness and Gneezy (2008) . Unfortunately, this approach ignores many of the most interesting strategic interactions.
The trust game would measure only trustfulness of the first mover but not trustworthiness of the second mover. The ultimatum game could not be used to measure expectations of fairness that are signaled by rejection of an "unfair" offer.
2. Study an analogous one-shot game. For example, a researcher might assume that the second mover's decision in a trust game is analogous to a first mover's decision in a dictator game and simply conduct an experiment using the dictator game. The weakness of this approach is that even when two games are identical in terms of their formal structure, they may evoke different behaviors from actual players (e.g., reciprocity in the trust game and generosity in the dictator game).
3. Randomize the first mover's contribution so that it is unrelated to the potential outcomes of the second mover. The most straightforward way would be to pair human second movers with computer-generated first movers. For example, offers in an ultimatum game may be chosen by a predetermined computer algorithm instead of a real human first mover, as in Sanfey et al. (2003) . If people choose different strategies when constant. We recommend a fully saturated model because the analyst is seldom in a position to know whether such special conditions hold.
playing against a computer (Blount 1995) , however, this approach may produce results of limited value if the aim is to form generalizations about human versus human interactions. One way to circumvent this limitation would be to tell subjects that they are playing against other humans when in fact they are playing against computers. This design is considered out of bounds in the field of experimental economics because it involves deception (Friedman and Shyam 1994; Friedman et al. 2004 ). 4. Pre-screen first movers based on their first moves in previous rounds of a game and pair them with second movers who are playing for the first time. This will effectively give control over the first move to the experimenter while letting second movers respond to real human behavior.
5. Make the second mover's decision independent of the first mover's behavior by employing the strategy method (Selten 1967) , by which the second mover lists all of her responses to possible plays by the first mover. For example, Ashraf et al. (2006) and Cesarini et al. (2008) asked second movers in their trust game experiments to indicate how much money they would give back in response to every possible sum of money that the first mover might give to them, at which point the researchers informed the subjects how much money they earned based on the actual sequence of moves. Similarly, Solnick (2001) asked second movers in an ultimatum game to write down the minimum offer that they would accept before they learned about the real offer made by the first mover. Brandts and Charness (2000) let their subjects make simultaneous decisions in the games of Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma. Although the strategy method seems to produce the same results as the direct response method in some cases (Brandts and 18 A design that falls in a grey area in terms of deception may be found in McCabe et al. (2003) . A random subset of first movers had to cooperate (treatment), while the subjects assigned to the control group were free to choose between cooperation and defection. The second mover's behavior was measured only for those whose first mover cooperated. This setup of the "voluntary" and "involuntary" trust games was originally developed by McCabe et al. (1998) . Similarly, Cox (2004) predetermined the amount allegedly sent by the "first movers" in one of the treatment groups. Fischbacher et al. 2012 ), more work is needed to assess the correspondence between the two methods.
Suppose the strategy method were used to gauge the behavior of second movers in the example given in Tables 1 and 2 . How would the researcher analyze the results? Every second mover provides two choices: how they would respond if the first mover gives 0 tokens and how they would respond if the first mover gives 10 tokens. If the first mover is female, we observe the potential outcomes and ; if the first mover is male, we observe and . In order to measure the ATE of the first mover's gender conditional on the first mover contributing 10 tokens, we compare the average in the treatment group to the average in the control group. Because these experimental groups are formed through random assignment, this estimator is unbiased. 
The Intrusion of Uncontrolled Factors
The previous section illustrated how unmodeled heterogeneity may bias estimates of the ATE for the second mover in sequential games. A related point is that uncontrolled stimuli can change the causal estimand revealed by the experiment. This estimand may not be the causal parameter that the researcher intended to measure when designing the experiment. This concern applies even to one-shot games or to the analysis of first mover behavior in multi-round games. Table 3 provides a simple example of how uncontrolled stimuli alter the experimental estimand. Consider a simple experiment examining the effect of anonymity on trust. The treatment intended by the researcher is seeing a photograph of a partner in a trust game. The schedule of outcomes depicts four types of players' potential outcomes in the first round of a trust game. Each player has three potential outcomes, representing the number of tokens contributed in the first round under three different conditions: (1) the first mover is shown no photo 19 Notice that one could dispense with random assignment if it were possible to observe both the treated and untreated potential outcomes for every subject. In principle, this could be accomplished by asking subjects to record their responses to every possible first move. In practice, it may be impossible for subjects to accurately gauge and report their of the second mover, (2) the first mover is shown a photo that reveals the second mover to be an attractive-looking person, and (3) the first mover is shown a photo that reveals the second mover to be an unattractive-looking person. The scenario depicted in the table imagines that one of the four player types is attractive and the other three are unattractive. Suppose the four player types are drawn with replacement, in which case we have 4 x 4 = 16 possible pairings of first and second movers.
[ Table 3 about here]
The schedule of potential outcomes indicates that the average treatment effect of being shown an attractive photo versus no photo at all is 2.5. Being shown an unattractive photo versus no photo has an ATE of -2.5. Now imagine that the experimenter assigns subjects to one of two experimental conditions:
either they see a photo or they do not ( Table 4 ). The expected contribution in the photo condition is 60/16 = 3.75, whereas the expected contribution in the anonymous condition is 80/16 = 5. The implication seems to be that showing photos lessens the average first mover's trust by 1.25 tokens. This estimate is neither the ATE of attractive photos nor the ATE of unattractive photos but rather a weighted average of the two, with weights equal to the share of attractive and unattractive people in the subject pool. Put another way, the experiment is interpretable not as the effect of "photos" but rather as the weighted effect of different kinds of photos. The weights are local to each sample: another subject pool with identical potential outcomes but different shares of attractive people will generate different treatment effects. When presenting results from experiments with uncontrolled stimuli, it is important to give readers a sense of what these confounders are and how they vary across subjects so that future experiments of the same kind have a reference point for comparison. A concern, however, is that the experimenter may be unable to observe or quantify all uncontrolled stimuli.
[ Table 4 about here] potential responses to both forms of the treatment, especially if subjects feel embarrassed to admit that they respond differently to males and females.
What kinds of uncontrolled stimuli may be found in the literature? Some subjects in Glaeser et al. (2000) knew each other before the experiment, introducing various aspects of their pre-existing relationships as uncontrolled confounders. Subjects in Janssen et al. (2011) could and did exchange chat messages. Eckel and Grossman (2001) let the players of an ultimatum game face each other, introducing a confounding effect of nonverbal communication. Eckel and Wilson (2004) used subjects' photographs in one of the treatment groups, but they had no control over the content of the photographs. Studies that use the subjects' real first name instead of a photograph as a proxy for gender or ethnicity (Buchan et al. 2008) are also prone to bias because the experimenter does not know what else the names may signal to subjects (e.g., age, class, or region).
One remedy is to withhold all information about other players except for their monetary contributions (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Burks et al. 2003; Sefton et al. 2007 ). Another option is to allow communication but to control fully the content of what is exchanged. Doing this in a naturalistic manner without resorting to deception remains a design challenge. In principle, the effect of seeing a photo could be disentangled from the effect of attractiveness if everyone in the treatment group were exposed to the same set of photographs. A second-best solution that does not rely on deception would be to pre-screen subjects according to whether their photos are rated similarly by outside observers. 
Causal Inference in Repeated Games
Economics experiments often use "stationary replication" -with subjects repeating the same decision task several times, each time with fresh endowments.
Researchers conducting repeated-play games frequently study the effects of random manipulations, such as allowing subjects the option of punishing players 20 Somewhere in between are designs that regulate certain forms of communication and leave others uncontrolled. For example, Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Eckel and Wilson (2004) varied the amount of available information across treatment groups, although they did not exercise full control over the content. In order for this design to generate unbiased causal inferences, a researcher would have to measure and model heterogeneity in communication.
who fail to contribute to the public good in a public goods dilemma. For example, Fehr and Gächter (2000) famously showed that costly punishment can sustain cooperation in a repeated public goods game.
As one might surmise from our discussion of the two-period trust game, analysis of multi-period games is susceptible to bias. Consider the case of a very simple public goods experiment in which players are paired together at random.
Each round, one player decides how much to contribute to the public good. Both players observe the contribution, and play alternates for three rounds. The treatment is whether failure to contribute to the public good is punishable by a third party. (For simplicity, assume the threat of punishment is never actually acted on.) The schedule of potential outcomes depicted in Table 5 shows how much each player contributes in each round under all possible scenarios. The schedule of potential outcomes has two notable features. First, the average treatment effect of punishment is zero in round one, and unit-level treatment effects are precisely zero for all players in rounds 2 and 3.
[ Table 5 about here] Despite the fact that the average effect of the punishment treatment is zero, the experiment on average generates a positive estimated effect when we consider the contribution rate in round 3. Expected contributions in the no punishment condition are 60/16 = 3.75, whereas expected contributions in the punishment condition are 80/16 = 5 (see Table 6 ). What accounts for this peculiar result? In the first round, the average level of contributions is the same in the treatment and control groups, but the threat of punishment causes different players (Players 2 and 4) to contribute. Both players' contributions induce others to contribute in round 2, but Player 2 reciprocates their generosity in round 3 while Player 4 does not. Taken at face value, the experiment seems to show that the threat of punishment induces cooperation in round 3, but in light of Table 5 this apparent effect has nothing to do with how subjects, on average, respond to the threat of punishment in each round. Instead, the effect reflects the uncontrolled factors that are set in motion in round 1 when certain players contribute instead of others. The players are randomly assigned to experimental conditions, but due to heterogeneity in subjects' potential outcomes in round 1, the treatment is no longer fully under the control of the experimenter by round 3. The sobering implication is that any source of unobserved heterogeneity among subjects in round 1 can bias estimates of the ATE in subsequent rounds.
[ Table 6 about here]
The problem of uncontrolled stimuli quickly defies back-end statistical remedies in iterated games. Even a basic experimental design with only one partner, two possible outcomes (cooperate, defect), and 10 rounds of a public goods game creates 2 10 possible trajectories. For any given subject, the true counterfactual would be a subject facing precisely the same sequence of ten partners' behaviors and differing only in treatment assignment. With 2 10 theoretical possibilities and N typically in dozens or hundreds, it would be virtually impossible to find a meaningful pair of subjects to compare.
To identify the ATE, it is not sufficient to control for the number of the round (Burnham et al. 2000; Eckel and Grossman 2001) or for the lagged dependent variable Sefton et al. 2007 ) in a regression equation. As Table 6 demonstrates, estimation is prone to bias even if one measures the outcome by the last round instead of pooling all the rounds together.
Inadequacy of standard statistical methods may help explain why some of the most frequently replicated experiments -for example, repeated games using the "partner" versus "stranger" treatment -produce discrepant results (Sul 2012) .
However valuable, replication alone will not overcome problems of systematic bias. As discussed in section 3.2, an unbiased estimate of the ATE could be recovered (in principle) from a fully saturated regression model that would control not only for the results of each round, but also for all the interactions between these rounds. Since the number of required regressors rises rapidly with the number of rounds, this modeling approach is infeasible without extraordinary numbers of subjects.
More viable design-based solutions range from creating fully exogenous treatments to measuring complete schedules of potential outcomes, as discussed in the section on two-stage games. Alternatively, one can redefine the estimand of interest. If we are interested in how treatments affect group-level outcomes, we could define potential outcomes at the group level and ignore the dynamics that are set in motion by individual-level heterogeneity. However, estimation and reporting would have to take into account the fact that the effective number of observations is now a small number of groups and not the much larger number of individual subjects who comprise the groups.
Conclusion
The statistical analysis of experimental data has recently attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, thanks in part to the growing volume and prominence of experimental research throughout the social sciences. Models of potential outcomes (Neyman 1923 (Neyman [1990 ; Rubin 1974 Rubin , 1990 ) have led researchers to take a fresh look at old estimation techniques such as instrumental variables regression (Angrist et al. 1996) , to investigate the properties of covariate adjustment using regression (Freedman 2008) , and to critique common statistical practices, such as path analysis (Rubin 2005) .
Accompanying this new wave of statistical work is an emphasis on design- At the same time, the message of this paper is that the analysis of lab experiments should be more firmly grounded in design-based identification than is currently the case. Although the experimenter can exercise greater control over the experimental design in a lab, uncontrolled heterogeneity threatens unbiased causal inference even in the laboratory setting. Given heterogeneity among subjects, a fundamental design concern has to do with the use of random assignment. In some of the articles we reviewed, random assignment was not used or, when used, was undone by asymmetrical retention of subjects in the treatment and control groups. In several instances, we found it impossible to tell from the write-up how subjects were allocated to experimental conditions or whether random assignment was jeopardized by attrition. Another concern has to do with uncontrolled variation in experimental stimuli. When this variation is measured and modeled correctly, inference problems can be held in check. Commonly, however, confounding factors are neither fully measured nor exhaustively modeled, jeopardizing unbiased inference. As we show specifically for the case of two-stage and repeated games, standard estimation techniques do not correct for confounders associated with behavior in prior rounds even when that behavior is fully observable. This concern is not unique to the lab; it applies also to field experiments that attempt to disentangle the effects of compound treatments (Gerber and Green 2012) .
Fortunately, our suggestions for design, reporting, and estimation are relatively easy to implement. No fundamental shift in thinking is required for researchers to implement and report randomization procedures. The suggested designs we outlined in section 3.2 for obtaining average treatment effects amid players' repeated interactions are not novel. A well-developed statistical literature discusses the problem of deploying treatments that vary in unmeasured ways.
Much the same could be said for other statistical issues that we did not address, such as the properly sizing hypothesis tests in the face of multiple comparisons (Aickin and Gensler 1996) , constructing confidence intervals when ad hoc stopping rules are used to determine when to halt data collection (Cornfield 1966) , avoiding biases introduced when post-treatment variables are used as covariates (Robins and Greenland 1992) , or addressing the file-drawer problem that distorts meta-analyses when "uninteresting" results go unreported (Scargle 2000) . These problems are common to both experimental and non-experimental research, and the first step in remedying them is to call attention to the threats they pose to unbiased causal inference so that problems may be addressed through improved design and replication. a In this table, Y i (m) represents the potential outcome for subject i in round 1 if this subject were exposed to a male opponent. Y i (f) represents the potential outcome for subject i in round 1 if this subject were exposed to a female opponent. Potential outcomes for the second mover are expressed as Y i (amount,sex), where the argument amount refers to the amount played by the first mover and sex refers to the sex of the first mover. b This table lists the outcomes that would be observed under all possible random assignments of subject types depicted in Table 1 . Potential outcomes for the second mover are expressed as Y i (amount,sex), where the argument amount refers to the amount played by the first mover and sex refers to the sex of the first mover. assignments of subject types depicted in Table 3 . Subjects assigned to the photo condition reveal either Y(attractive photo) or Y(unattractive photo) depending on their opponent. The "With Punishment" columns show potential outcomes if subjects were treated, and the "Without Punishment" columns show potential outcomes if subjects were not treated. Second movers' potential outcomes are denoted Y2(Y1=x), where x is the first mover's behavior. Third movers' potential outcomes are denoted Y3(Y1=x,Y2=w), where x and w indicate first and second mover's behaviors, respectively. 
